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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE P. JONES, 
Petitioner/Appellant/ 
v. 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief of 
Driver License Services, : 
Department of Public Safety, 
for the State of Utah, : 
Defendant Respondent. : .. 
Case No. 20635 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of driver license revoca-
tion issued by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, 
Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On June 5, 1984 before the Driver License Division of the 
Department of Public Safety, a hearing was held pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 41-6-44.10 Utah Code Anno, (amended 
1983). Bruce P. Jones, appellant in the instant action, filed 
a timely request to subsection (2) of that statute for a trial 
de novo in the District Court of his county of residence, Salt 
Lake County. On February 19, 1985 trial de novo was held to 
determine whether Mr. Jones1 driver's license should be revoked 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for violation of Utah implied consent statute. Subsequently, 
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge presiding, ordered that 
Mr* Jones1 petition be denied and his driver's license be 
revoked pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10 Utah Code Anno, (amended 
1983). Notice of Appeal was filed on April 19f 1985, within 30 
days of the final order of the Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the District Court Order 
revoking his driver's license and an order remanding this case 
back to the District Court with instruction to order reinstate-
ment of Mr. Jones' driving privileges. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented on appeal is whether the District 
Court erred in ruling that Mr. Jones was properly requested to 
submit to a chemical test pursuant to §41-6-44.10 Utah Code Anno, 
(amended 198 3). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 9, 1984, Bruce P. Jones was stopped by Utah High 
way Patrol Trooper Lynn Richardson and detained as a suspect in 
an alleged burglary. R.4. Subsequently, Officer Chris Nielson of 
Nephi Police Department responded to a back-up call and placed 
Mr. Jones under arrest for burglary. R.7. Officer Nielson did 
not see Mr. Jones operate a vehicle R. 12, 23-24. Mr. Jones 
was subsequently rearrested by Officer Nielson, this time for 
-2-
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driving under the influence, and requested to take a chemical 
test pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10 Utah Code Anno, (amended 1983). 
R.13-14. Following his refusal to take the test, Officer Nielson 
interviewed Mr. Jones in accordance with the standard alcohol 
influence report form R.13-14. At the de novo hearing, the Court, 
over Mr. Jones1 objection, also admitted as evidence statements 
made by Mr. Jones to Officer Nielson after the refusal had occured. 
R. 18-20,21,27. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant will argue that since the arresting officer 
did not observe any operation or physical control of a vehicle 
on the part Mr. Jones, there existed no grounds to believe him 
to be in violation of Section 41-6-44 Utah Code Anno, (amended 
1983), and therefore the request to submit to a chemical test 
was improper. 
Further, the Court erred in admitting and considering as 
evidence the contents of the DUI report form which contained 
statements made by Mr. Jones after the officer deemed the refusal 
to have occurred. 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah implied consent statute [§41-6-44.10 Utah Code 
Anno, (amended 1983)] states in pertinent part: 
-3-
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Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state 
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical 
test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the 
purpose of determining whether he was driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having 
a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug as detailed in 
section 41-6-44, so long as the test is or tests are ad-
ministered at the direction of a peace officer having 
grounds to believe that person to have been driving or 
i.n actual physical control of a motor vehicle [emphas 
added]. 1 
This Court has determined that the grounds which exist must be 
"reasonable" grounds based upon facts and circumstances within the 
officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy 
information, Ballard v. State of Utah, Motor Vehicle Division, 59 5 
P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979). Furthermore, this Court has held that it i 
incumbent upon the Department of Public Safety to show evidence 
of driving or actual physical control in addition to showing that 
the arresting officer had grounds to believe the individual was 
under the influence. Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1982). The Garcia decision acknowledges "two separate burdens to 
be borne by the Department". 64 5 P.2d 6 52. 
In the instant case, the record reveals no admissable 
evidence of driving upon which to base Officer Nielsonfs request 
for a chemical test. Officer Nielson clearly testifed that he 
did not see Mr. Jones drive. Nor did Trooper Richardson or any 
1. The cited statutes are presented in the form effective as 
of April 9, 1984. 
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other witness appear to testify that Mr. Jones was driving an 
automobile. 
Moreover, Mr. Jones was initially arrested by Trooper 
Richardson not for driving under the influence, but upon suspicion 
of burglary. It is an extension of the old common law requirement 
on warrantless arrests as a general rule that misdemeanors neces-
2 
sarily be committed in the presence of the arresting officer. 
The rule was partly excepted to include warrantless arrests for 
driving under the influence when an accident is involved, as 
codified in §41-6-44(8) Utah Code Anno, (amended 1933). That 
portion of the statute has recently been modified to broaden the 
3 
exception. 
It is clear that the legislature recognized that driving 
under the influence arrests were to be made by an officer who 
witnessed the offense. By carving out a statutory exception, this 
requirement is prospectively eliminated. However, Officer Nielson 
did not have the benefit of H.B. 193 on April 9, 1984. 
2. §77-7-2 Utah Code Anno, (amended 1985). 
3. H.B. 19 3 has amended subsection 8 to read: A peace officer 
may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of 
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe 
the violation has occurred, although not in his presence, and 
if the officer has probable cause to believe the violation 
was committed by the person. 
-5-
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By the same token, the officer did not have the benefit 
of Mr. Jones responses to sections 10 and 11 of the DUI report form 
at the time the request and refusal took place. The Court erred 
in admitting the statements of Mr. Jones made after the refusal, 
since they could not have been used to formulate the grounds for 
offering the chemical test. As the Ballard case requires, the 
officer cannot offer a chemical test unless 
11
 [r] easonable grounds exist where the facts and circum-
stance sjd±hi£i_the^ and of which he 
had reasonably trustworthy information and sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief that the situation exists". [emphasis added] 
595 P.2d at 1306. 
It is clear that at the time the chemical test was offered and deemed 
4 
refused, the "situation11 described in Ballard did not exist. 
The admission of the DUI report form itself was prejudicial 
5 
and the Court erred in admitting it. While the record is not 
clear as to how much Officer Nielson relied on his report during 
4. At the time of the Officer's request to take a chemical test, 
no driving, either observed or admitted, had occurred. See 
Dayhoff v. Colorado Motor Vehicle Division. 595 P.2d 1051 
(Colo. 1979). 
5. If the report is deemed to be a past recollection recorded 
under Utah Rules of Evidence 803(5), the document itself is 
not admissable. Contra.. Sagers v. International Smelting Co. 
50 Utah 423, 168 P.105 (1917). Other jurisdictions hold that" 
the contents of the writing are admissable only when the witness 
has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully 
and accurately. Elam v. Soares, 577 P.2d 1336 (Oregon 1978). 
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testimony, there is no record that he had no independent recollec-
tion of the events testified to. Therefore, admission of the report 
or its contents was error. 
This error is made significant in light of the fact that 
the Court used this report in arriving at its oral ruling from the 
bench. 
It is herein asserted that Officer Nielson lacked probable 
cause for the driving under the influence arrest of Bruce P. Jones, 
and that no reasonable ground existed upon which to request a 
chemical test in conformity with §41-6-66.10(1) Utah Code Anno, 
(amended 198 3). The District Court erred in ordering the revocation 
of Mr. Jones1 license. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons as stated above, the appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the ruling of the District Court 
and remand the case back with instructions that appellant's petition 
be granted and his driver license be reinstated. 
DATED this /-> day of October, 1985. 
^-—\ -'—) / 
- - Q ? / s 1 
•STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney for Appellant/petitioner 
/ 
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ADDENDUM 
Applicable Statutory Provisions 
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U.C.A. 41-6-44 (8) 
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a 
person for a violation of this section when the violation 
is coupled with an accident or collision in which the per-
son is involved and when the violation has, in fact, been 
committed, although not in his presence, if the officer 
has reasonable cause to believe that the violation was 
committed by the person. 
U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 (1) 
Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state 
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical 
test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the 
purpose of determining whether he was drivina or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under 
the influence of alcohol, any drug or combination of alco-
hol and any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44, so long 
as the test is or tests are administered at the direction 
of a peace office having grounds to believe that person 
to have been driving or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statu-
torily prohibited, or while under the influence of alco-
hol, any drug, or combinations of alcohol and any drug 
as detailed in section 41-6-44. A peace officer shall 
determine which of the aforesaid tests shall be admini-
stered. 
No person who has been requested under this section 
to submit to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, 
or urine, shall have' the right to select the test tests 
to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace 
officer to arrange for any specific test requested by a 
peace officer and it shall not be a defense in any crimi-
nal, civil or administrative proceeding resulting from a 
person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests. 
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U.C.A. 77-7-2 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority 
of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted 
in his presence, 
(2) When he has reasonable cause to believe a 
felony has been committed and has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the person arrested has committed it; 
(3) When he has reasonable cause to believe the 
person has committed a public offense, and there is reason-
able cause for believing the person may: 
(a) Flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest-
lb) Destroy or conceal evidence of the commi-
ssion of the offense; or 
(c) Injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 803 (5) 
(5)
 m Recorded Recollection. 
A memorandum or record concernina a matter about which 
a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recol-
lection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shov/n 
to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter 
was fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correct-
ly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into 
evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless 
offered by an adverse party. 
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